Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Mercer, James R., Jr. (2013-02-22) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Mercer, James R., Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
rN\ SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
I \.. JU COUNTY OF ALBAt'fY . 
"--- ------------------------------------------~------------------------)( 
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DECIS·ION/ORDER 
Index No. 6330-12 
R.J.I. No. 01-12-ST4203 
Richard Mott, J.S.C. 
Motion Return Date: Albany County Special Term, February 8, 2013 
APPEARANCES: 
Petitioner: 
Respondent: 
Mott, J. 
James R. Mercer, Jr. 
Self Represented Petitioner 
Livingston Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 49 
Sqnyea, NY 14556-0049 
Eric T. Schneiderman, Esq. 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
The Capitol 
A)frany, NY 12224-0341 · 
V(.aura A. Sprague, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 
of Counsel 
Pe.titioner filed this Article 78 proceeding to challenge Respondent's May 22, 2012, 
decision denying him release on parole. 
Petitioner is serving an aggregate sentence of 25 to SO years' imprisonment. He was 
./ 
convicted in Niagara County in 1987 of Rape in the First Degree (2 counts), Rape in the Second 
Degree (6 counts), Sodomy in the First Degree (6 counts), Sodomy in the Second Degree (3 
counts), Sodomy in the Third Degree, Sex Abuse in the First Degree (2 counts) and Assault in 
the Second Degree in connection with three separate incidents in June, 1986. 
In its decision denying parole, the panel almost exclusively focused on Petitioner's 
convictions: 
Parole denied, hold 24 months; next appearance 5/2014. 
Parole is denied. 
This panel concludes that after a careful review of your records and of 
the interview, there is a reasona~le probability that if you were released at tlits 
time, there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that our release would not be compatible 
· with the public safety and welfare of the community. 
This Decision was based on the following: You appear before this Panel 
serving time for multiple counts of sodomy, rape, sexual abuse and assault. tn 
1986 you abducted three underage females off the streets, took them to a 
secluded area and forced them to commit sodomy and/ or engage in sexual 
intercourse. One of your yictim's fought back and was stabbed by you. 
Your criminal history has been considered and includes a prior sexual 
abuse first degree state bid and an adjudicated YO attempted burglary. 
The panel has considered your reentry plans, along with your programs, 
vocational and educational accomplishments and all matters required by law. 
However, you are sex offender who remains a threat to the community; parole 
is denied at this time. 
It is well settled that release on parole is a discretionary function of the Parole 
Board and that its determination should not be disturbed by the Court unless it is shown that 
the Board's decision is irrational "bordering on impropriety" and that the determination was, 
thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000); Matter of King 
v. NYS Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (ist Dept. 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994). In 
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reviewing the Board's decision, th~ Court must also examine whether the Board's discretion 
was properly exercised in accordance with the parole statute. Matter of Thwaites v. New York 
State Board of Parole, 34 Misc.3d 694 (20-11). 
Executive Law 259-i(2)( c) provides general criteria the Board must consider. And the 
statute provides the Board with specific factors to consider in determining whether the 
general criteria has been met. See, Executive Law 259-ii(2)( c)(A)( r -viii). 
Executive Law 259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the Parole Board to 
promulgate new procedures in making parole release decisions. These "shall incorporate risk 
and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board, th.e 
likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state Board of 
parole in. determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision." 
These statutory changes sought to modernize the work of the Parole Board by 
requiring the Board to adopt procedures that incorporate social science research in assessing 
post-release and recidivism risks. Matter of Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, supra, 
citing Genty, "Changes To Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift", NYLJ, 
September 1, 2011. 
Here, the Parole Board relied almost entirely on the nature of Petitioner's crime in 
denying parole. While his institutional a~complishments and release plans were discussed, the 
Board focused on the circumstances of the crimes committed 25 years ago. When it evaluated 
Petitioner's release, it employed past-focused rhetoric, not future-focused risk assessment 
analysis. Such reasons cannot sustain a rational determination of the inquiry at hand: 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the 
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w~lfare of society. Executive La"": 259-i(2)( c); Matter of Thwaites v. New York State Board of 
Parole, supra. 
The Court finds the Board's decision denying parole in this case to be arbitrary and 
capricious, irrational, and improper based upon the Parole Board's failure to articulate any 
rational, nonconclusory basis, other than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, why 
Petitioner1s release on parole could not meet the criteria in Executive Law 259-ii(Z)(c)(A); 
Matter of Thwaites v. New York State Board of Paroifj!, supra. 
Further, presumably in an effort to implement the required, new procedures, 
Petitioner was interviewed on May 7, 2012, and a "COMP AS ReEntry Risk Assessment" was 
prepared. Petitioner was informed at his May 22, 2012 interview that the Board had a "risk 
assessment evaluation," and that it would consider it. However, the record does not show that 
Petitioner received a copy of the assessment after it was prepared or that he reviewed same 
before his Board appearance. The Petition strongly implies that Petitioner did not see or 
review the assessment. Petitioner wrote: 
Appellant believes that in the five to ten ·minute interview he had with Ms. 
Walker, where she read him questions 35 - 74 and recorded his answers, he 
was entitled to read and supply input in regards to the questions on the Risk 
Assessment. In the alternative, Ms. Walker should have reviewed Appellant's 
records to ensure that correct responses were made on the Risk Assessment for 
the purpose of the Board having an error free record before it. 
Respondent does not controvert these allegations and has not asserted that Petitioner 
received or reviewed the Risk Assessment before meeting the Board, nor has Respondent 
provided any written rules and regulations indicating a policy with regard to providing the 
inmate with the Assessment and/or a review of the document for errors by the inmate or 
anyone before the Board considers it. See, Matter of Cotto v. Evans, 2013 WL 486508 
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(N.Y.Sup.)(St. Lawrence County, 20i'3). 
Petitioner has pointed out thirty-four errors he asserts are in the Risk Assessment, 
many of which, if corrected, would make his risk of re-offense far less likely. For example, and 
this is not an exhaustive list of the claimed errors, the ."Criminogenic Need Scales" section 
shows that Petitioner is rated 7-Prob~ble for Vocation/Education need even though he has 
completed six vocational courses and has earned his GED and 72 college credits while 
imprisoned. For no discernible reason the Assessment is "unsure" about whether Petitioner 
has "basic educational needs that need to be addressed,"when in fact, Petitioner has no such 
needs. Further, Petitioner is rated 9-High for Prison Misconduct, but his Disciplinary History 
indicates that in the previous 24 months Petitioner had no Tier 3 infractions, 2 Tier 2 
infractions (moderate offenses) and none of the enumerated infractions. For no discernible 
reason the Assessment answers "yes" as to whether the Petitioner appears "to have notable 
disciplinary issues." In addition, Petitioner is rated 9-High for history of violence, but the 
Assessment asserts incorrectly that Petitioner was on poth parole and probation at the time of 
his offense, that excluding the current case, Petitioner had 3 "prior felony assault offenses (n~t 
murder, sex or domestic violence arrests)" when in fact he has none, and that excluding the 
present case, Petitioner was sentenced to prison twice, when there was one prior 
commitment. Moreover, Petitioner's need is rated 4-Unlikely with regard to "Low Family 
Support," and "unsure" with regard to positive family support, when all of the specific items on 
the Evaluation show that Petitioner plans to stay with his family on release, that family 
members have visited him during incarceration, and that the inmate believes his relatives are 
supportive. In sum, the Risk Assessment contains errors that tilt it toward a denial of parole 
and away from release. 
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Petitioner argues that the Board's reliance on this incorrect or erroneous information 
in the Risk Assessment requires vacatur of the Board's determination. See, Matter of Henry v. 
Dennison, 40 A.D.3d 1175 (3d Dept 2007), Matter of Smith v. New York State Board of Parole, 
34 A.D.3d 1156 (3d Dept 2006), Matter Plevy v. Travis, 17 AD.3d 879 (3d Dept. 2005). 
In response, Respondent asserts that Petitioner waived any objection to the claimed 
errors. The cases relied upon by Respondent, however, are inapposite. And there is nothing in 
the record to show that Petitioner knew the contents of the Risk Assessment and was aware of 
the errors in it at the hearing. Cf. Matter of Morel v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 580 (3d Dept 2000). In 
these circumstances, having an extended opportunity to talk before the Board is not a basis to 
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impose a waiver or cure errors. Nothing in the record shows Petitioner's knowledge of the 
errors in the Assessment at the hearing. 
Respondent also argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the errors in the 
Risk Assessment affected the Board's decision. In fact, Executive Law 259(c)(4) requires the 
Parole Board to "incorporate risk and needs principles to .. measure the rehabilitation of 
persons appearing before the Board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release," 
and the Risk Assessment was the sole document before the Board purporting to carry out that 
evaluation. Serious errors in the Risk Assessment that devalue Petitioner's likelihood of 
success on release and exaggerate his likelihood of recidivism impermissibly skew the Board's 
balancing of the mandatory factors in Executive Law 259-i(Z)( c)(A)(I - viii) in favor of denial 
of parole. 
Accordingly, the Board of Parole's determination of May 22, 2012 is vacated and the 
matter Is remanded to the Board of Parole which, within 30 days of the receipt of a copy of this 
Decision/Order, shall hold a new parole hearing and issue a decision thereon within 10 days 
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of the hearing. The new hearing shall be held before a different panel of the Parole Board. 
This constitutes the Decision/Order of the Court. 
The Court is forwarding the original Decision and Order directly to the Respondent, 
who is required to comply with the provisions of CPLR. 2220 with regard to the filing and · 
entry thereof. A photocopy of the Decision and Order is being forwarded to all other parties 
who appeared in the action. All original motion papers are being delivered by the Court 
either to the Supreme Court Clerk for transmission to the County Clerk, or directly to 
the COUJ.?-ty Clerk. 
Dated: Claverack, New York 
Febn~ary 2 2- , 2013 
ENTER 
Papers considered: 
1. Order to Show Cause dated November 26, 2012; 
2. Affidavit in Supp ort r 
3. Verified Petition datt 
Denial Appeal dated, 
Albany County Clerk 
Document Number 11376356 
Rcvd 04/16/2013 3:40:12 PM 
1mm1~~1~tmmtm11ijm11m1m1m 
. ages "A" through "U"; 
4. Answer datep, January 28, 2013, and Affirmation of Laura A. Sprague, Esq. dated, 
January 28, 2013 with Exhibits A througlJ K 
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